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ABSTRACT
The planetary boundaries concept has profoundly changed the vocabulary and representa-
tion of global environmental issues. We bring a critical social science perspective to this
framework through the notion of societal boundaries and aim to provide a more nuanced
understanding of the social nature of thresholds. We start by highlighting the strengths and
weaknesses of planetary boundaries from a social science perspective. We then focus on
capitalist societies as a heuristic for discussing the expansionary dynamics, power relations,
and lock-ins of modern societies that impel highly unsustainable societal relations with
nature. While formulating societal boundaries implies a controversial process – based on
normative judgments, ethical concerns, and socio-political struggles – it has the potential to
offer guidelines for a just, social-ecological transformation. Collective autonomy and the pol-
itics of self-limitation are key elements of societal boundaries and are linked to important
proposals and pluriverse experiences to integrate well-being and boundaries. The role of the
state and propositions for radical alternative approaches to well-being have particular
importance. We conclude with reflections on social freedom, defined as the right not to live
at others’ expense. Toward the aim of defining boundaries through transdisciplinary and
democratic processes, we seek to open a dialogue on these issues.
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Over ten years ago, Johan Rockstr€om and colleagues
published a seminal work on nine “planetary
boundaries,” which rapidly became a crucial refer-
ence in the sustainability literature (Rockstr€om et al.
2009a, 2009b). Alongside the narrative of the Great
Acceleration (Steffen et al. 2004) and the concept of
the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000), the
concept of planetary boundaries changed the
scientific, as well as the popular, vocabulary on
environmental issues. Rockstr€om et al. (2009b)
ended the longer version of their article with a call
for additional work that would “focus on the soci-
etal dynamics that have led to the current situation”
of transgressed or nearly transgressed boundaries;
research that could propose “ways in which our
societies can stay within these boundaries.”
Reflecting on these dynamics, Steffen et al. (2015, 8)
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argue that the planetary boundaries framework does
not “take into account the deeper issues of equity
and causation. The current levels of the boundary
processes, and the transgressions of boundaries that
have already occurred, are unevenly caused by dif-
ferent human societies and different social groups.”
Indeed, in the planetary boundaries framework,
causation of transgressing boundaries is based on an
Earth-systems perspective which does not allow for
full consideration of the societal drivers of the eco-
logical crisis (Chakrabarty 2018).
In this article, we maintain that a social sciences
approach to the issue of thresholds and boundaries
is necessary, both to avoid a reductionist conception
of humanity as a de-socialized and de-historicized
totality (Gomez-Barris 2019), and also to more fully
understand the relation between social action and
ecological destruction (Malm and Hornborg 2014;
L€ovbrand et al. 2015; Swyngedouw and Ernstson
2018). We began with a discussion on the planetary
boundaries concept at a workshop of the Fourth
International Degrowth Conference in Leipzig
(2014) and this conversation was taken up again at
the Degrowth Conferences in Budapest (2016) and
in Malm€o (2018), where the writing process began,
and in Vienna (2020). It includes different voices,
opinions, and experiences across (inter)disciplinary
boundaries – sociology, philosophy, political science,
ecological economics, and environmental studies,
among others – from different regions of the world.
Where Rockstr€om et al. (2009b) argue that “(t)he
thresholds in key Earth System processes exist irre-
spective of peoples’ preferences, values, or compro-
mises based on political and socioeconomic
feasibility, such as expectations of technological
breakthroughs and fluctuations in economic
growth,” we claim that critical social science is
essential for going beyond the diagnosis of the trans-
gression of planetary boundaries to better explain
the societal reasons for the accelerated “human-
induced environmental change” that Rockstr€om and
colleagues reveal. Our argument is threefold. First,
we show how the rather technocratic understanding
of societal dynamics and societal relations to nature
of the planetary boundaries framework is flawed in
grasping socioeconomic drivers, processes, and
structures causing the ecological crisis.
Second, we focus on capitalist societies as a heur-
istic for discussing historical structural conditions,
institutions, actors, and power relations that drive
the ever-expanding material and energy flows
required in their societal reproduction – that is their
societal metabolism. Here we frame specific capital-
ist, fossil-fuel based and industrialist societal rela-
tions to nature (Haberl et al. 2019; G€org et al. 2020;
Becker, Hummel, and Jahn 2011).1
Finally, we introduce the alternative notion of
societal boundaries, or collectively defined thresh-
olds, that societies establish as self-limitations and
conditions for a “good life for all.” Societal bounda-
ries imply a contested and controversial process and
are based on normative judgements, ethical con-
cerns, and sociopolitical struggles. They have the
potential to act as guidelines for a just, social-eco-
logical transformation through the development of
collective autonomy or, in other words, “self-limi-
tation” (Gorz 1989). Here autonomy implies the lib-
eration from the heteronomous, pervasive logic of
unfettered expansion and acceleration that charac-
terizes modern, capitalistic societies, and it offers
the possibility of collectively and democratically
establishing rules that ensure social freedom and the
conditions for a collective good life (Gorz 1980;
Castoriadis 2010).2 Within societal boundaries and
through collective self-limitation, the conditions to
live a good life neither come at the expense of
others’ ability to do the same, nor of the flourishing
of future generations or nonhuman others (Kallis
2019; Fuchs, Sahakian, et al. 2021; Brand and
Wissen 2021). We argue that the process of defining
boundaries should involve social dialogue and polit-
ical negotiations with diverse scientific and non-
scientific actors, with the inclusion of different
knowledge systems (Jahn, Bergmann, and Keil 2012;
Teng€o et al. 2017). Only through a deep democratic
process can self-limitation acquire societal legitim-
acy.3 With this article, we seek to open a dialogue
on these issues.
The article is structured into four parts. The next
section focuses on the conceptualization of planetary
boundaries introduced by Rockstr€om et al. (2009a,
2009b), critically examining the theoretical assump-
tions of the idea. We highlight the strengths of the
approach from a critical social science perspective,
while identifying key weaknesses and raising ques-
tions about the choices of boundaries selected and
their thresholds, and about how these choices may
mask issues of power and inequality. The third sec-
tion then proposes a conceptual framework that
examines the dynamics and lock-ins of modern
societies by focusing on their capitalist growth
imperatives. Considering “lock-ins” opens the possi-
bility for a more nuanced understanding of the soci-
etal drivers and causes of crossing planetary
boundaries and for adequate countermeasures, as
well as for a dialogue between environmentally
engaged research in the natural and social sciences
and in the humanities. In the fourth section, we
introduce the concept of societal boundaries as an
alternative to current technocratic and incremental
governance efforts of social-ecological transforma-
tions, and note the role boundaries and
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implemented thresholds can play in the configur-
ation of radical alternatives. We argue that societal
boundaries are required and suggest how they can
be established democratically as a social process of
self-limitation that opens a space to ensure a good
life for all. We conclude by interweaving the threads
of these arguments and offering final thoughts on
the idea of freedom in relation to soci-
etal boundaries.
Ten years of planetary boundaries: a critical
retrospective
The concept of planetary boundaries was introduced
by Johan Rockstr€om and colleagues in 2009 in the
wake of the United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen where countries endea-
vored – but ultimately failed – to agree upon a new
framework for climate-change mitigation. In this
context, the planetary boundaries conception was
proposed. In contrast to earlier debates on environ-
mental limits, it focused less on the exhaustion of
natural resources than on the biophysical impacts of
resource use and material consumption: the overfer-
tilization of soils, the destruction of ecosystems, and
the overtaxing of the capacity of sinks to absorb
emissions and other effluents produced by
human activities.
With the introduction of the planetary bounda-
ries’ framework, Rockstr€om et al. (2009a, 472) delin-
eate “the safe operating space for humanity,” which
lies firmly within the Holocene state. The authors
argue, “The evidence so far suggests that, as long as
the thresholds are not crossed, humanity has the
freedom to pursue long-term social and economic
development” (Rockstr€om et al. 2009a, 475). For
each threshold, the authors proposed a quantitative
“control variable” (Rockstr€om et al. 2009a, 472,
473), that is, a universal, robust indicator of system
change and for which reliable data exist. A bound-
ary exists then at a distance from a presumed trigger
value of the control variable, which may encourage
less attention to thresholds that are sufficiently
remote and do not require immediate attention
(Cohen 2021). The planetary boundaries framework
underscores how non-linear dynamics characterize
Earth-system changes and key processes (e.g., global
biogeochemical cycles).
The concept rests on ideas, hypotheses, and
insights from empirical studies in the Earth sciences,
ecological economics, and theories of complex sys-
tems resilience. Based on this theoretical foundation,
the biosphere is understood and analyzed in terms
of its biogeochemical cycles and self-regulating eco-
logical systems, its physical circulation systems, and
its biophysical features. The concept builds on
resilience thinking (Holling 1973; Berkes, Colding,
and Folke 2003) and focuses on determining thresh-
olds in the so-called Earth system where non-linear,
often abrupt dynamics are set in motion that cause
the planet to depart from what is called the “safe
operating space” (Rockstr€om et al. 2009a). Although
sometimes difficult to identify exactly – due to
incomplete scientific understanding of the complex
feedbacks in the Earth system, among other factors
– the planetary boundaries concept aims to map the
safe operating space based on an appreciation of
these thresholds in non-linear system dynamics of
the Earth system (Steffen et al. 2015). Boundaries
are, as the authors point out, normative judgements
for the Earth system in general. Given risks and
uncertainties, the authors quantify planetary boun-
daries by taking a risk-averse and conservative
approach (Rockstr€om et al. 2009a, 473).
Rockstr€om and colleagues are careful to avoid the
technocratic hubris of prescribing a level and com-
position of societal metabolism for humanity. They
argue, rightly, that boundaries have to be concep-
tualized or defined based on the risk tolerance of
societies to non-linear and potentially catastrophic
change. Rockstr€om et al. (2009b) state that the
“predominant paradigm of social and economic
development remains largely oblivious to the risk of
human-induced environmental disasters at continen-
tal to planetary scales” (p. 32). And yet, given that
the “safe operating space” identified for the Earth
system can also be viewed as part of our planetary
commons with implications for all life forms, this
notion further requires considering its political
implications. While Rockstr€om et al. acknowledge
the normative and ultimately political nature of the
boundaries concept, it is not further discussed.
Economic activity is identified as a key driver of
anthropogenic environmental change that can push
“coupled human-environmental systems” beyond
thresholds of known stability and into zones of
non-linear and potentially “catastrophic” environ-
mental change (Rockstr€om et al. 2009b), but is also
not sufficiently problematized. A recent paper sug-
gests that the boundaries concept should include
consideration for a “just” as well as a “safe” operat-
ing space (Rockstr€om, et al. 2021), yet it stops short
of grappling with the complexities of different forms
of justice – not solely distributional, but also pro-
cedural – and the political implications of such
an approach.
Strengths of the planetary boundaries framework
The introduction of the planetary boundaries frame-
work was a conscious intervention in environmental
sciences and policy circles that aimed at nothing less
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than proposing a “new approach to defining bio-
physical preconditions for human development”
(Rockstr€om et al. 2009a, 474). We identify three
main strengths of the framework with regard to its
potential contributions to transformative knowledge.
First, it has widened the political and academic
debate on the ecological crisis beyond climate
change, which has dominated much of sustainability
discussions since the turn of the century, to a more
varied account of ecological and biogeochemical
forces induced by societal metabolism, including
topics such as biodiversity loss and eutrophication.
Planetary boundaries proponents warn that the
complexity of, and interlinkages among, different
biophysical subsystems or processes are of utmost
importance, and that if tipping points are reached,
the resulting changes may be unpredictable and pos-
sibly irreversible.
As a second strength, the framework rests on the
ontological claim that contemporary human soci-
eties have become dependent for their flourishing
on the “stable environmental conditions” – i.e., eco-
logical and geological conditions – of the Holocene
and that there are identifiable thresholds within
which this stability is secured. Framing ecological
questions in this way stresses the deep connections
between geology and biology, as well as human and
environmental history (Chakrabarty 2020). It has
provoked scholars from the humanities and social
sciences to analyze particular socio-historical inter-
connections between human and nonhuman agents
(as in the early colonial plantations) in a critical dia-
logue with the natural sciences (Haraway and
Tsing 2019).
The planetary boundaries concept also represents
a considerable refinement over previous approaches
to defining ecological limits, such as carrying cap-
acity (e.g., Daily and Ehrlich 1992) or the assess-
ment of “overshoot” with the ecological footprint
(Wackernagel and Rees 1997). Carrying capacity is a
concept in population ecology aiming to determine
the maximum population that can be sustained by
the resources available in an ecosystem, without
accounting for the role of social structure; for
example, that not all populations have access to the
same resources, nor are responsible for the same
negative impacts (Haberl and Erb 2017). As an
aggregate indicator, the ecological footprint
addressed some of the shortcomings of the carrying
capacity concept by reflecting technological changes
in resource extraction and use (Wackernagel et al.
2004), yet stopped short of providing levels of per-
turbation in relation to life in the Holocene.
A third strength lies in the iconic image used to
depict planetary boundaries: an infographic with
Earth overlaid by concentric orbits representing
three spaces as distances from a center, a safe green
zone, a yellow zone of risk, and an outermost red
zone of thresholds crossed. The boundaries for the
nine key Earth-system processes identified in the
framework are presented as dimensions emanating
from the center in a simple and intuitive representa-
tion of boundary transgression.4 The popular suc-
cess of the planetary boundaries concept can
certainly be attributed to the visual power of this
illustration that rapidly became standard fare in sci-
entific and educational presentations. From the
World Economic Forum in Davos to students strik-
ing for climate protection, the iconic infographic
has been adopted as a metonym for unsustainability
and ecological catastrophe. It offers a powerful nar-
rative for the limits of business-as-usual in terms of
growth and development. In addition, the bounda-
ries concept has given rise to the charge that we
must “start living within planetary boundaries” as
pronounced by the youth activist Greta Thunberg
(2019). Thus, the notion of planetary boundaries
went beyond the mere presentation of scientific
results to change the frame of popular debates and
to inform subsequent research on sustainability
issues.5 However, the diagram is a simplification –
while easy to communicate, it suppresses the com-
plexity of different planetary processes as well as
their interlinkages.
Weaknesses of the planetary boundaries framework
We also see weaknesses and ambiguities that allow
for “business-as-usual” and “pro-status quo” inter-
pretations of the framework.6 The planetary boun-
daries concept identified the “predominant
paradigm of social and economic development”
(Rockstr€om et al. 2009b) as the main driver toward
“continental and global” environmental disasters,
without explaining which societal, political, and eco-
nomic conditions lead to unsustainability, and in
what way. It is not economic activities in the
abstract that lead to ecological crisis but rather eco-
nomic activities with particular logics and under
certain circumstances. More precisely, we argue that
the growth imperative of capitalist economies, as
well as other particular characteristics detailed
below, are the main drivers of the ecological crisis
and exacerbated trends already underway (see next
section). Indeed, even before capitalist growth
economies, the enclosures of the natural commons
– land, water, biodiversity and creative human labor
– as part of transitions from feudalism through to
militarized mercantile capitalist conquests and settler
colonialism, inscribed global accumulation with a
destructive logic for our planetary ecology.
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Further, the planetary boundaries framework can
support interpretations that do not solely emphasize
technocratic operational approaches and costs, but
also assume that these alone can be the solution.
The technocratic bias embedded in the proposed
political solutions that often accompanies planetary
boundaries research ranges from including nuclear
energy as a replacement for fossil fuels to the
deployment of large-scale geoengineering technolo-
gies (Surprise 2018; Markusson, McLaren, and
Tyfield 2018). This technocratic drift is not inciden-
tal, but rather is built into the planetary boundaries
framework itself, in its view of the Earth from an
“astronaut’s eye view” that can only be provided by
scientists, but which runs a risk of ignoring severe
regional or local impacts of global warming trig-
gered long before global thresholds are crossed
(Sachs 1999; Neyrat 2016; Biermann and Kim 2020,
502–3). From this perspective, Earth is envisioned
as a globe that appears – at least in principle – as if
it can be managed as a cybernetic system, albeit
with the complication of non-linear feedback loops.
Technical solutions, however, have been subject
to a number of criticisms from social scientists and
humanities scholars (Muraca and Neuber 2018;
Gardiner, McKinnon, and Fragniere 2020; Pichler et
al. 2017). For instance, the level of energy produc-
tion so far guaranteed by fossil fuels cannot be
delivered by renewables without significant tradeoffs
involving, for example, the use of land surface for
biomass or large river dams for hydroelectric power.
These are tradeoffs which, given current embedded
environmental inequalities and social asymmetries
in power and wealth, would dramatically exacerbate
socioenvironmental conflicts worldwide and intro-
duce more competition in the use of resources
(Avila 2018).
The blind spots of the planetary boundaries
framework risk becoming part of a “new critical
orthodoxy” (see Brand 2016a, 2016b for the debate
on social-ecological transformations) which provides
a radical and critical diagnosis of “disastrous long-
term social and environmental disruption”
(Rockstr€om et al. 2009b). But it leaves little space
for more comprehensive analyses that address soci-
etal root causes of urgent problems and propose
more radical solutions. It also fails to address the
political aspects of structural changes required to
avoid crossing boundaries. In that sense, the planet-
ary boundary concept runs the danger of creating a
new truth or orthodoxy (orthos, Greek for “correct,”
and doxa, meaning “opinion” or “belief”) that may
overlook broad and rich debates on societal drivers,
the causes of the ecological crisis, and the crossing
of planetary boundaries. Unsurprisingly, the planet-
ary boundaries concept is conveniently
instrumentalized in technocratic governance efforts
to serve the normative aim of “sustainable devel-
opment” (Gomez-Baggethun and Naredo 2015),
without challenging the underlying structural condi-
tions of unsustainability.
Political ecologists and social ecological econo-
mists have long criticized how the framing of limits
as something external that resides in nature and is
given to humanity “depoliticizes” decisions at stake
(Asara et al. 2015; Streissler 2016; Muraca and
D€oring 2018; L€ovbrand et al. 2015). The post-polit-
ical definition of planetary boundaries renders invis-
ible, or at least relativizes, the social conflict
embedded in the trajectories that transgress the
boundaries, or the distribution of the benefits and
impacts that they entail (Kallis 2019; Dietz and
Wissen 2009; Brand and Wissen 2021). Moreover, it
threatens to mask economic dynamics such as the
increasing competition for scarce resources or what
movements have called the “last great dispossession
of the commons.”
A further limit of the planetary boundaries
framework lies in the sociopolitical and socioethical
implications of selecting these particular nine boun-
daries. While Earth-system science presents an
important valuation perspective with respect to spe-
cific biophysical processes included in the planetary
boundaries, it does not discuss the normative and
political dimensions involved in selecting these
boundaries. For example, in the case of biodiversity
loss, “ethics” is mentioned as a dimension of accept-
ability of species loss, but is mostly intended in
terms of traditional conservation biology literature
and not further examined. By failing to clarify and
critically discuss its normative assumptions, the
planetary boundaries concept limits its consideration
to a rather narrow spectrum of values and world-
views and neglects perspectives voiced, for example,
in environmental justice literature or in feminist
and indigenous care ethics (Whyte and Cuomo
2017) and in other environmental values literature
(O’Neill et al. 2018).
The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has
addressed this critique by considering a wider spec-
trum of values besides the traditional intrinsic value
of species and of wilderness (Dıaz et al. 2015, IPBES
2019; for a comprehensive critique of the planetary
boundaries approach in the field of biodiversity see
Montoya, Donohue, and Pimm 2018). It includes,
for example, relational values and contextual Nature
Contributions to People (NCP), as well as
Indigenous and local knowledge systems and their
expressions of value, thus offering a different foun-
dation to frame deleterious environmental change
and the loss of biodiversity (Dıaz et al. 2018,
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supplementary materials; Pascual et al. 2017).
Approaches like IPBES enable a more fruitful dia-
logue with concepts like biocultural diversity (Rozzi
et al. 2018) or biodiversity as “territory plus culture”
(Escobar 1996, 70) that call attention to the colonial
expropriation and occupation of land, and the con-
sequent erasure of Indigenous knowledge, languages,
and practices as an inextricable component of bio-
diversity loss.7 These variables are essential for iden-
tifying thresholds. An inter- and transdisciplinary
approach that integrates natural and social science
approaches and links them to diverse knowledge
systems beyond the Western scientific method is
necessary, as discussed, for example, under the term
“traditional and indigenous knowledge” and
acknowledged within the IPBES process (Dıaz et al.
2018; Teng€o et al. 2017).
Such an approach can also account for other
worlding practices or ways of framing and embody-
ing societal relations to nature that diverge from the
mainstream project of Western development (de la
Cadena 2019). From this point of view, potential
barriers or obstacles to transformation already arise
in the process of establishing boundaries – and not
only when established boundaries are translated into
political measures. For example, the risk tolerance
of a society or community depends on the (often
sociopolitical and power-dependent) conditions
under which it can adapt to rapid change and co-
determine the living conditions of its members. As,
for example, Native American Potawatomi scholar
Kyle Whyte (2018) points out, settler colonialism
has heavily infringed upon tribes’ traditionally
strong resilience and adaptation ability through dis-
possession, forced dislocation, oppression, and cul-
tural erasure. When ecological and epistemic
redundancies are jeopardized and self-determination
over territorial access, land use, and mobility are
hindered, a community’s risk tolerance amounts to
nihil (Whyte 2018), as the consequences of climate
change and the unequal exposure to COVID-19 by
Indigenous communities through the Americas now
demonstrate.
Furthermore, the planetary boundaries concept
emphasizes the need to bring the “coupled human
Earth System” back into a “safe operating space,”
which assumes that the Holocene or, at least the
recent past, was safe for all people. Given societal
structures of power and exploitation, this is defin-
itely not the case. Societal values that address
dimensions of the climate crisis such as the unequal
distribution of risks or other aspects of climate just-
ice may require an adaptation of the variables sig-
naling a “safe operating space.” In other words, for
which part of the global population and for what
purposes is a certain “operating space” safe? What is
acceptable for one social group might rely upon
unacceptable forms of oppression and exposure to
environmental hazards for others. Global
“agreement” on the maximum of 1.5C of global
heating might help sustain living conditions and
ecosystem functions in some parts of the world, but
puts under severe pressure people living in low lying
coastal areas and those depending on the glacier
functions of the Andes. More recent iterations of
the planetary boundaries concept by Steffen et al.
(2015, 2018; see also overview in Biermann and Kim
2020) identify sub-global levels for five planetary
boundaries that have strong regional operating
scales and account for inequalities at a global scale,
but in light of the literature produced by the social
sciences on these phenomena, much more engage-
ment from and with the social sciences is desirable,
as we discuss below.8
We agree with the original argument made in the
Rockstrom et al. paper in 2009 that boundaries are
sociopolitical constructs.9 While they are informed
by science – in other words based on the currently
available (necessarily incomplete) understanding of
Earth-system dynamics – their definition also
requires normative and political assumptions of
what are acceptable or “unacceptable” paths for
humanity in general, to use Rockstr€om et al.’s terms
(2009a, 472). Reaching across scales, boundaries also
imply a notion of (un)acceptable configurations of
limits from the local to the national, regional, and
global levels. Yet from a purely global perspective, if
those in the global North tried to negotiate the dis-
tribution of environmental benefits and burdens
within and between societies, given the dominant
socioeconomic systems, it would surely result in
multiple forms of inequality. This is the case as the
very idea of any acceptable or unacceptable distribu-
tion path is inescapably tied to unequal gender and
class relations, racism, colonialism, and imperialism,
to name but a few dimensions of the complexity of
social relations across scales.
Understanding social dynamics and
obstacles: bringing capitalism back in
The social-ecological processes driving the planet
toward multiple tipping points identified by
Rockstr€om et al. have intensified since the publica-
tion of the first planetary boundaries articles in
2009 (IPBES 2019). In a paper on accelerating cli-
mate change, Steffen et al. (2018, 2) reiterated that
this continued acceleration can be blamed on
“technological lock-in and socioeconomic inertia in
human systems.” On one hand, the authors
acknowledged that “uneven distribution of causation
and benefits” must be addressed (Steffen et al. 2018,
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8). On the other hand, they engage only marginally
with the social sciences to understand social drivers
related to lock-ins and inertia.
Both the proponents of the planetary boundaries
framework and critical social scientists share the
conviction that business-as-usual will likely be cata-
strophic. However, the arguments within the planet-
ary boundaries framework are either overly general
and abstract, pointing to “humanity,” “human sys-
tems,” and “human population,” or overly specific,
identifying changes that can be implemented imme-
diately by mobilizing (and not challenging) existing
“business as usual” relations. Such a perspective
runs the danger of simulating an “eco-politics” that
only deals with symptoms rather than root causes of
unsustainability (Bl€uhdorn 2011; Gomez-Baggethun
and Naredo 2015). This is the challenge of attempt-
ing to analyze societal issues without a conceptual
framework for understanding sociocultural and pol-
itical-economic processes. Solutions appear prag-
matic and feasible under the unquestioned
acceptance of status quo conditions (Malm and
Hornborg 2014). Most sustainability policies lack
this deeper analysis and so remain in the realm of
“ecological modernization” (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and
Spaargaren 2010), stopping short of targeting insti-
tutions, power relations, and growth logics.
Moreover, they are unable to understand why eco-
logical modernization, as well as related green econ-
omy interventions to tackle the ecological crisis, do
not succeed and instead sometimes increase pressure
on other ecological processes or the burden on other
social groups (Wanner 2015; Lessenich 2019; Brand
and Wissen 2021).10
As a corrective to this situation, we contend that
both “technological lock-in”11 and “socio-economic
inertia” are produced by social structures of capital.
We use “capitalist economies and societies” as a
heuristic device for uncovering how capitalism as a
social form functions.12 The term’s enduring con-
ceptual strength is in capturing some of the essential
dynamics of modern societies, core features of their
historical trajectory and social structures, which
otherwise remain unrecognized. Research in political
ecology and social ecological economics has
explored how the structural drivers of capitalism
frame practices, institutions, and actions that cause
ecological destruction (Schnaiberg 1980; Spash 2012;
Martınez-Alier 1987; Pichler et al. 2017; Pineault
2018; Pirgmaier and Steinberger 2019; Mattioli et al.
2020; Peet, Robbins, and Watts 2010). Authors
working from these vantage points, highlight how
social relations of production, reproduction, and liv-
ing, as well as questions of property, contemporary
enclosures of the commons, power, and domination
are explanatory factors of growth, acceleration, and
ecological crisis.13 Because the structures and
dynamics of capitalist societies are full of ambigu-
ities and contradictions, the issues a study of capit-
alism illuminate can be entry points for confronting
ecological crises more effectively.
A capitalist economy can be defined in a number
of ways. Initial alternatives are through its social
relations of property, which is based on the dual
separation between labor and capital (Marx 1996
[1867]; Wood 2002), or between valued and deval-
ued labor in the reproductive sphere (Mies 1998;
Barca 2020). It can also be demarcated in terms of
how markets organize economic relations (Polanyi
2001 [1944]) or how the commodity and exchange-
value form organizes the relation to both objects in
general (Kosoy and Corbera 2010; Robertson 2012)
and the means of production (Minsky 2008). The
capitalist economy can also be defined by its expan-
sionary drive and imperative of accumulation that
directs its development (Luxemburg 1951 [1913];
Foster 2005) and governs its relation to nature
(Altvater 1993; Saito 2017). For the purposes of this
article, we propose an initial definition of the core
features of this mode of production, reproduction,
and living and outline its societal relations to nature
in the following key points.
First, capitalism is a monetary production econ-
omy (Graziani 2003) where societal wealth “presents
itself as an immense accumulation of commodities”
(Marx 1996 [1867]). In such an economy, rights and
capacities to mobilize labor power, to transform
nature, and to create and dispose of artifacts take
on a monetary form. The unequal accumulation of
money (either in the form of credit or savings)
implies unequal power over nature and society
(Hornborg 2019).14 Production is oriented toward
profit, not social needs – what classical economists
understood as the subsumption of use value by
exchange value. Monetary profits are the dominant
way surpluses are extracted and privately appropri-
ated (another form is taxation). Private for-profit
investment is the main driving force of growth and
change (Lavoie 2014). Competition in various forms
(from relatively free to monopolistic) coerces capit-
alist firms to invest and direct their monetary sur-
plus toward further expansion in a constant search
for returns (Crotty 1993). The capacity to spend for
investment purposes is thus a dominant form of
social power (Kalecki 1965). Capital investment is
the primary source of “technological lock-in,” by
fixing capital in tangible and intangible forms such
as privately-owned machines and productive equip-
ment, buildings, infrastructures, communication sys-
tems and platforms as well as patents, brands,
proprietary knowledge, and data – all of which are
exploited to generate profits and rent accumulation
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(Foster 2005; Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004;
Klitgaard 2013). And it delineates the future ways of
producing and consuming (Ceddia 2020), and thus,
alongside other social processes discussed below,
for-profit investment governs the metabolism and
relation to nature of capitalist societies (Kronenberg
2010; Pichler et al. 2017).
These social relations are structured around the
asymmetry between dominant classes – and their
top managers – that control the investment process
for their private benefit and thus accumulate capital
in a monetary form, versus classes obliged to sell
their labor power to earn the income necessary for
their subsistence at varying levels of affluence
(Robinson 1956; Aglietta 2000 [1979]). This asym-
metry is furthermore intertwined with gendered,
racialized, and imperial relations of domination
(Robinson 1983; Federici 2004; Brand and Wissen
2021). New intellectual property regimes, whether
for COVID-19 vaccines or seeds, add to the exclu-
sionary logic. Inequality is not an outcome of capit-
alist social relations: it is their foundation.
In today’s global economy, the process of capital
accumulation delineated above is particularly
embodied in large corporations that must strive to
grow to maintain their economic dominance in the
markets in which they are embedded. They must
also actively shape and condition demand for their
output to maximize their profits, to structure their
commodity chains and circuits to minimize costs
and externalize burdens, and to engage in innov-
ation to defend the value of long-term fixed capital
assets against competitors and state regulation
(Eichner 1976; Roy 1997; Foster and McChesney
2012; Crotty 2003; Suwandi, Jonna, and Foster
2019). In contrast, as a class, wage-earners materi-
ally depend on capitalist production and expansion
for their livelihood and subsistence which comple-
ments provisioning and care produced in the repro-
ductive sphere (Biesecker and Hofmeister 2010;
Fine, Bayliss, and Robertson 2018). At the same
time, capitalists depend on the effective demand of
wage-earners to absorb the produced output and
participate as consumers in capitalism’s expansion-
ary logic. This conflictual interdependency between
capital and labor varies through time and space and
leads to distinct phases of capitalist development or
accumulation regimes which also have distinct rela-
tions to nature (Boyer 2000; G€org et al. 2020). For
example, during the postwar period, economic
growth as measured by gross domestic product
(GDP) regulated this conflictual relation in the glo-
bal North, and was the material basis for social and
political emancipation, democracy, and cultural
flourishing for a large number of people (albeit
never for all) inside the limits imposed by capitalist
development and at a considerable ecological cost
(Pineault 2021. Some emerging economies such as
China are seeing similar developments. Economic
growth has supported and, to a certain extent stabi-
lized, capitalist societies by facilitating distribution
and material participation, thereby reducing class
conflicts and sustaining the output legitimation of
welfare democracies (Kallis et al. 2018; G€org et al.
2020). In these circumstances, economic growth has
become the material basis of social life and of the
societal organization it has enabled
(Schmelzer 2016).
This is why, when faced with the impending cri-
sis of economic growth in early industrialized coun-
tries, brought about by ecological and social
constraints, governments intervened to salvage
growth at any cost via – inter alia – neoliberal
adjustments including the deregulation of labor and
financial markets, the commodification of public
services, and austerity policies. From a stabilization
vantage point, growth then turned into the main
driver of ecological instability and social inequalities.
From a biophysical perspective, it could be argued
that capital has mostly served to accumulate ever-
higher concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in
the Earth’s atmosphere, as well as future emissions
locked into the existing stock of material artifacts
and infrastructures that rely on extracting fossil fuels
(Krausmann et al. 2020). On the basis of social pos-
ition, these compounded crises (ecological, eco-
nomic, and social) are felt earlier by some than by
others, and they negatively impact some people’s
lives whereas others might benefit. Thus, to critically
engage with the contradictions between nature and
capitalism means also to stress that there is no one
global ecological crisis that means the same thing to
all humans: there are always winners and losers
(Dietz and Wissen 2009). However, the capitalist
growth imperative and its consequences that we
have outlined above do not determine the economic
relations of contemporary societies. As we will
argue, other “economic logics” co-exist with capital-
ism and are alternatives to its destructive logic.
Second, critical social science has produced much
evidence that governments, states, and international
political regimes – understood as institutional appa-
ratuses that formulate and implement public policies
– play a major role in the ongoing escalation of cap-
italist growth and related transgression of planetary
boundaries (Hausknost 2020; G€org et al. 2017;
Brand, G€org, and Wissen 2011). Rather than being
neutral regulators, they create the overall institu-
tional, legal, and infrastructural conditions for the
growth economy. This is partly because govern-
ments and the state are financially dependent on a
functioning capitalist economy. The capitalist
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growth imperative and its unsustainable implications
are thus largely inscribed within the state’s own
rationalities, institutions, bureaucratic practices, and
subjectivities. This is one of the reasons, for
example, why it has been so difficult to implement
effective policies against the planned obsolescence of
products: a successful elimination of planned obso-
lescence and a shift toward a service economy
(based on repairing and reusing) would inevitably
reduce the profit margin of companies and therefore
impact economic growth, which has effects on the
political stability of governments (as the COVID-19
lockdown has shown) in the absence of radical insti-
tutional changes.
At the same time, the state is a field of societal
contest (Poulantzas 2013 [1978 ]; Jessop 2007;
Bretthauer et al. 2011). For instance, there have
been huge achievements of decommodification, of a
number of spheres including the workforce, educa-
tion, public services, and social security through the
welfare state because it put political priorities over
the motive of profit making (Esping-Andersen
1990). These achievements have been supported in
the past by a reallocation and redistribution of eco-
nomic growth to those services and have been heav-
ily jeopardized by the neoliberal restructuring of
societies toward unrestrained economic expansion
without redistribution (Harvey 2010; Dardot and
Laval 2017). This is endangering the stability of wel-
fare democracies worldwide and opening the doors
to authoritarian regimes (Kallis et al. 2018). The
challenge is how to embrace constraints on expan-
sion via democratization and not through authori-
tarian crisis solutions that focus on the competitive
advantage of one nation (or certain racial groups
within nations) at the expense of all others.
Third, capitalist societies are growth economies
that violate basic conditions for the reproduction of
biophysical systems. Because economic processes are
– like biological ones – entropic with respect to the
system in which they are embedded, they transform
available energy and complex matter into structures
and release waste to the environment (Georgescu-
Roegen 1971). While biological processes mostly
depend on the temporal flow of solar energy to
regenerate and build complexity, growth economies
accelerate these processes by using fossil deposits
(essentially highly concentrated solar energy that is
available at will, but is not renewable) and expand
the capacity to exploit more resources (Muraca and
D€oring 2018). In contrast to traditional agrarian
societies primarily based on metabolizing biomass,
industrial societies have developed on the basis of a
fossil energy-based metabolism (Huber 2009;
Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl 2007). The shift from
traditional agrarian to industrial metabolism is an
ongoing process that was slowly prepared and
enabled by a process which Marx calls primitive
accumulation, which among others takes the form
of colonialism and – through it – the appropriation
of cheap nature (plantations or mines in the colo-
nies) and cheap labor (enslaved and forced labor)
(Harvey 2014; Moore 2015; Haraway and Tsing
2019). More specifically, the growth imperative of
capitalist societies has its biophysical basis in an
ecologically and socially unsustainable metabolism,
and the destruction of the commons. This metabol-
ism can be analyzed both in terms of the through-
put of energy and material and of the accumulation
of biophysical stocks that further lock-in growth
(Krausmann et al. 2017). This applies in particular
to fossil fuels (Georgescu-Roegen 1975; Altvater
2006; Huber 2009; Malm 2018), but also to other
minerals, including metals, and to the human
appropriation of net primary production (HANPP)
of the world’s plants which provokes land-use
change and biodiversity loss (Haberl, Erb, and
Krausmann 2014).
Much vaunted decoupling between material use
and economic growth as measured by GDP – result-
ing in reduced material intensity or in improved
material efficiency – veils the real problem from a
metabolic perspective, as do the effects of changing
spatial patterns in production and consumption.15
Although GDP may grow faster than material use (a
trend hailed as improved resource efficiency),
material use often continues to grow in absolute
terms (Haberl et al. 2020; Wiedenhofer et al. 2020).
Even stagnation of per capita resource extraction
and consumption in the advanced capitalist core
appears to depend at least partially on growing
imports, especially of fossil fuels (Schaffartzik, Duro,
and Krausmann 2019).
Approaches to social-ecological economics, eco-
logically grounded political economy, political ecol-
ogy, and social ecology complement the notion of
escalating societal metabolism by emphasizing the
conflictual and institutionally-mediated forms of the
societal appropriation of nature. Moreover, the ful-
fillment of historically contingent basic societal
needs such as food and housing, mobility and com-
munications, health and clothing, and their biophys-
ical dimensions are inseparably linked to symbolic
and discursive dimensions (Becker, Hummel, and
Jahn 2011; G€org 2011). For instance, an automobile
is not just a vehicle with certain biophysical proper-
ties but stands also for a particular way of produc-
tion and living. More specifically, the car is
constituted by a powerful automotive industry and
numerous wage laborers and is linked to values
such as freedom, individual independence, mascu-
linity, and progress (Mattioli et al. 2020).
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Fourth, critical social science disposes of a large
body of research that shows how and why the capit-
alist growth imperative is deeply inscribed into
everyday practices, involving social norms and
material arrangements (Wilhite 2016; Guillen-Royo
and Wilhite 2015; Sahakian and Anatharaman 2020;
Brand and Wissen 2021). In the sociology of con-
sumption, this has led to reflections on how such
routinized and habitual practices are difficult to
change. The growth imperative – also framed as
“development,” especially in the global South – is
entrenched not only in existing institutions but also
in overall societal norms, values, and discourses
(Escobar 1995) to the point that it operates as a
mental infrastructure (Welzer 2011) or a subtle
mode of subjectivation (Muraca 2020). And yet,
most mainstream efforts to promote more sustain-
able modes of living tend to focus on better inform-
ing individuals, nudging people to behave better,
encouraging green consumerism, or introducing
more efficient units of technology, approaches
which have been criticized as being too limited in
their understanding of social life (see Shove 2018).
Critical social science understands the societal
addiction to growth as a powerful societal imaginary
that can be challenged by radical social experiments,
movements, and alternative, collective practices
(Van Griethuysen 2010; Castoriadis and Murphy
1985; Muraca 2013; Schmelzer and Vetter 2019;
Sahakian et al. 2021).
Fifth, our broad understanding of capitalism
sheds light on unequal global social relations.
Internationally, societal metabolisms are highly dif-
ferentiated. Research has shown that they are struc-
tured by unequal exchange between core and
periphery which have coupled surplus-absorbing
and -producing economies and societies (Boatca
2015). Though global growth is often seen as the
remedy for these inequalities, in fact it tends to lead
to international polarization in metabolic rates, con-
tributing to inequality in the transgressing of the
planetary boundaries (Duro, Schaffartzik, and
Krausmann 2018) and accelerated destruction of life
enabling commons systems. Moreover, the unsus-
tainable patterns of production and consumption
that cause the transgression of planetary boundaries
are based on an – in principle – unequal appropri-
ation of and access to natural resources, natural
sinks, and labor power between global elites and
(upper) middle classes, on the one hand, and subal-
tern groups, on the other, across both the global
North and the global South (Brand and
Wissen 2021).
By adopting a more complex perspective inspired
by critical social science, sustainability research can
develop tools to better understand the unequal
distribution of material appropriation of societies,
not only in a purely descriptive manner (cf. Steffen
et al. 2015, 8) but analytically as a relational feature
of societies and economies locked into relations of
unequal ecological exchange (Hornborg 2019) and
the dynamics of “cost-shifting” (Kapp 1978 [1959];
Zografos and Robbins 2020) of environmental con-
straints toward least powerful polities
and economies.
Finally, capitalist societies are reproduced by
and reproduce an uneven order of knowledge that
manifests itself both in the celebration and rejec-
tion of scientific rationality. Natural as well as
social sciences tend to promote technocratic and
expert discourses as canonized by scholarly
research to the detriment of other forms of know-
ledge or they tap into “local” or “traditional” know-
ledge when it can be made (economically)
productive (Lander 2000). Following the same
logic, far-right politicians as climate-change deniers
tend to delegitimize expert knowledge in the name
of an alleged “common sense of ordinary people”
in order to promote populist agendas aimed all the
same at excluding alternative knowledge systems.
Critical social science, and particularly feminist as
well as decolonial approaches from the global
South, strongly question the Western/modern con-
ception of nature as separate from human societies
and instead highlight their interdependencies, rela-
tionality, and co-productivity (Escobar 2012;
Santos, Radicchi, and Zagnoli 2019). For instance,
the emphasis on territoriality put forward by Latin
American scholars (Porto-Gonçalves 2001;
Alimonda, Toro Perez, and Martin 2017; Svampa
2018) has shed light on how those relations
between nature and culture differ according to spe-
cific power configurations in specific places.
According to these authors, the “globalist
perspectives” of the body of literature within sus-
tainability studies are universalizing Western per-
spectives (Alimonda 2019; Moreano, Molina, and
Bryant 2017). The planetary boundaries framework
risks reinforcing not only the invisibilization of
other forms of knowledge in the diagnosis of the
current crisis, but also the suppression of solution
paths embedded in a plurality of ways of inhabiting
the world in the global South and in the global
North by suggesting top-68down technocratic solu-
tions such as large-scale climate engineering or cli-
mate-smart agriculture projects (Newell and Taylor
2018; Karlsson et al. 2018).
From this briefly outlined theoretical perspective,
respecting planetary boundaries to ensure a “safe
operating space for humanity” requires that capital-
ism’s logic of growth, domination, and exploitation,
as well as its attendant social processes and societal
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metabolism, are so constrained that accumulation
would be severely impaired and disrupted, throwing
the system into a prolonged state of crisis (Blauwhof
2012; Shao et al. 2017). Capitalist societies generate
complex dynamics that are difficult to control and
to redirect into a socially and ecologically appropri-
ate direction. Adequate policies to promote far-
reaching social-ecological transformations at various
spatial scales are structurally overburdened not only
by the complexity of ecological problems and crises
but also by societal structures and processes.
Therefore, political will, better designed policies,
more financial resources, and new modes of govern-
ance linking classical political actors with societal
stakeholders are important. However, a more
nuanced understanding of the socioeconomic and
cultural lock-ins of destructive societal relations to
nature is necessary and already well examined
within critical social science.
Examining planetary boundaries from this per-
spective changes the scope of the social-ecological
transformations needed to remain in a metabolic
“safe space.” It underlines the strategic need to take
into account the dynamics and variability of the
capitalist mode of production, reproduction, and liv-
ing, as well as its social power relations and social
inequalities within and across societies. In contrast
to the use of “humanity” as a homogenous “we” in
the planetary boundaries framing, a critical analysis
of dominant social structures and processes and
already existing alternatives makes power relations
visible. It draws attention to the power-infused insti-
tutionalized organization of the societal metabolism
– or more specifically to capitalist social relations
and societal relations to nature – and its highly
destructive character. Instead of holding onto
planetary boundaries as the rationally incontrovert-
ible moral space within which political decisions
should operate, critical social science keeps open the
space of moral and political deliberation in the face
of the ecological crisis.16 Doing so implies, for
example, highlighting epistemic justice and the con-
ditions under which weaker actors and subaltern
communities can articulate value and knowledge
systems in their own terms (Temper and Del Bene
2016). It thereby renders political struggles and con-
flicts visible and exposes asymmetrical power rela-
tions of norms and values. And it highlights the
contested character of those relations and the variety
of alternative modes of living that are already
embodying imaginaries and practices of self-limita-
tion and responsibility toward nature. In the follow-
ing section, we sketch possible directions – while
recognizing the sociopolitical obstacles to social-eco-
logical transformations.
Societal boundaries for just social-ecological
transformations: ways forward
In the previous section, we presented some crucial
elements of an analytical framework to understand
the escalatory logic of capitalist societies and how it
is deeply inscribed into social structures, norms, and
values. The question that then follows is how to
unwind this logic. How can the metabolism of con-
temporary societies be de-escalated, and in a way
that is socially just? Critical social science has con-
tributed over the years not only to a better under-
standing of the drivers of unsustainability, but also
to identifying possible entry points for more sustain-
ability and for what far-reaching social-ecological
transformations might look like. In doing so, it
amplifies otherwise neglected voices and emphasizes
already existing alternatives. A critical social science
perspective not only offers an analysis of the domin-
ant capitalist system but also contributes to support-
ing a livable, just, and democratically organized
future where politics and societal relations are
guided by the notion of a “good life for all” within
planetary boundaries.
The focus is on conditions because it is not so
much the achievement that is up for debate, but
rather the substantial conditions that are a field for
ethical and political contestation.17 On one hand,
critical social science reveals what should be a “no-
go” for societies invested in framing structural con-
ditions that impede the crossing of planetary boun-
daries. On the other hand, it identifies and brings
into public debates certain “must-haves.” Crucial
requirements for the envisioned social-ecological
transformation processes include both principles and
values, such as reciprocal responsibilities and soli-
darity, to take successful and failed experiences ser-
iously, and criteria for establishing substantial
conditions for a good life for all and for the fulfill-
ment of socially negotiated needs.
In asking what kind of worlds “we” want to live
in, critical social science critically discusses how the
“we” participating in the deliberation is or can be
constituted, and how the conditions for well-being
or a good life are to be defined and framed, in con-
crete historical moments and contexts beyond a
solely Western understanding of prosperity. In this
sense, critical social science is highly policy-relevant
as it reveals unsustainable and unequal social rela-
tions as well as societal relations to nature and high-
lights their institutional embeddedness within and
articulations with power relations (and their eco-
logical fallout). Public policies and political decision
makers play an important role, but they are not the
sole audience of research results: the research is
intended to also challenge different affected actors
to place their interests and values into a broader
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context and to reflect critically on contextual condi-
tions, along with their practices, interests,
and strategies.
In the subsections that follow, we begin by
describing the paradigm of “societal boundaries” as
a form of societal self-limitation for social-ecological
transformations. We then discuss similarities with
existing perspectives, and what the societal bounda-
ries concept brings to the discussion. We then
address the central questions of how, by whom, and
for whom societal boundaries are defined and intro-
duce the debate on systemic alternatives to capitalist
principles. We conclude with reflections on govern-
ance systems and the necessity of binding rules.
Societal boundaries: a new paradigm emerging
out of concrete experiences
Societal boundaries need to be defined to cope with
the deepening ecological crisis and its devastating
socioeconomic impacts – especially for those who
already live under precarious conditions (see also
Biermann and Kim 2020, 514). Instead of being
objectively given by biophysical processes, societal
boundaries, as we understand them, emerge from
contested societal processes that lead to collectively
defined thresholds that societies commit not to tres-
pass. These limits pertain to poverty, inequality, eco-
logical destruction, injustices, subordination,
exploitation, consumption, defense of the commons,
and so forth. Societal boundaries are structural
boundaries, particularly set by political rules within
societies, that secure the material and energy prereq-
uisites toenable substantial conditions for a good life
for all. There is no guarantee that societies would
democratically decide a path toward self-limitation
nor that this can be achieved via consensus forma-
tion. This is where progressive social movements
and other political actors, political education, and
alternative projects come in: they reinforce and sup-
port sociocultural values and norms rooted in social
justice considerations, which in turn must be
embedded in social relations and institutions. To
become socially relevant, the value of such bounda-
ries is more or less accepted throughout societies,
and it informs policy-making processes.
Critical social science work can help to formulate
politics of self-limitation and demarcate societal
boundaries, social conditions, and sociopolitical
measures to respect these constraints – for example
by keeping fossil fuels in the ground and organizing
social life around alternatives with lower emissions
and less devastation of livelihoods. It also keeps
open space for critical questioning. The central idea
of societal boundaries is a change of analytical and
political perspectives: rather than thinking of the
planet as bounded, we insist to think of the planet
as potentially abundant – as long as we limit our-
selves collectively and make space for others to
share the resources it has to offer in a responsible
way among current living and future generations.
This is also a perspective of respectful cohabitation
with non-human others (Kallis 2019; Akbulut et al.
2019; Hickel 2019). Boundaries, planetary or soci-
etal, are not given; rather they are always relational,
a function of human intentions, actions, practices,
and interactions – and it is these factors that should
be bounded to make space for all. Shifting the focus
from boundaries and limits to self-limitation empha-
sizes that this is a social challenge and a process
rooted in forms of participation, collective self-
determination, and democratic deliberation. For
centuries, the democratic governance of the natural
commons, as common wealth in the global North
and South, gave us practice in self-limitation. Self-
limitation questions the idea of considering environ-
mental problems in terms of a technocratic chal-
lenge to address, which can implicitly include
shifting the boundaries or continuing with expan-
sion all the way up to the “no-trespass” point.
The term self-limitation echoes the literal mean-
ing of autonomy, or giving to oneself one’s own
laws or rules as an act of self-government. In the
traditional liberal understanding, autonomy is
rooted in the idea of an independent, individual self
that is not determined by external norms and there-
fore free. Yet in the radical tradition of autonomism,
it is intended as a social relation and a collective
process of self-determination via local, horizontal,
anti-authoritarian practices (Alcoff and Alcoff 2015).
What is common to both is the idea that freedom
implies giving oneself rules of conduct and therefore
limits, instead of following arbitrarily or externally
imposed ones. It constitutes the very foundation of
democracy as self-rule. Rather than ending where
someone else’s freedom begins, freedom as auton-
omy begins with the self-imposition of limits to
make space for others to simply be (Alcoff and
Alcoff 2015). When considered in its societal dimen-
sion, autonomy resists its opposite, heteronomy, or
the functional regulation of conduct according to
given principles, such as the so-called law of the
market or the mantra of austerity and growth. As
such, autonomy as collective self-limitation and self-
determination requires taking responsibility for
one’s own destiny and giving to oneself, as a com-
munity, self-imposed norms instead of following
external impositions (Gorz 1980; Castoriadis 2010;
Fuchs, Sahakian, et al. 2021; Muraca 2013). In this
way, autonomy implies liberation from the structural
and mental constraints of the capitalist imperatives.
As Gorz writes:
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[T]he point is to subject economic and technical
development to a pattern and orientations which
have been thought through and democratically
debated; to tie in the goals of the economy with the
free public expression of felt needs, instead of
creating needs for the sole purpose of enabling
capital to expand and commerce to develop (Gorz
1994, 8).
As a collective, complex, and conflictive societal
process, with respect to sustainability and social-eco-
logical transformations, self-limitation can be
framed in terms of enabling the conditions for a
good life for all rooted in the actual freedom of not
having to live at the expense of (human and non-
human) others.
The idea of autonomy as self-limitation is present
in different variations in many traditions, societies,
and communities across the world. For example,
Gandhi’s notion of swaraj implies autonomy and
freedom of the individual and the community as
bound by responsibilities and duties toward other
individuals and communities, and thereby necessar-
ily encompassing spiritual or ethical living within
limits and nonviolence, including toward nature
(Shrivastava 2019). Embracing autonomy as guiding
principle also implies making space for other world-
making practices in a pluriverse of socio-natural
configurations (Escobar 1995), instead of forcing
them into the so-called “one-world world” of the
Western dominant model of development as
growth. The pluriverse is “a world where many
worlds fit” (as the Mexican Zapatista movement
prominently coined it (Holloway and Pelaez 1998)),
that enables alliances across different social and
environmental movements and resisting commun-
ities coming together as “a political ecology of prac-
tices, negotiating their difficult being together in
heterogeneity” (Blaser and de la Cadena 2018, 4).
In this sense, a more radical understanding of
social-ecological transformations as one that consid-
ers the root causes of the problems and that adds
nuance to the underdeveloped normative statements
of the planetary boundaries proponents. This is not
an easy task because it entails rejecting the escala-
tory mode of production and of living that marked
most of the attempts at social transformations in the
20th century, a perspective that aimed to secure
social well-being and emancipation for some inhabi-
tants of the planet at the expense of human and
nonhuman others. It implies building alliances to
reinforce alternative conceptions of quality of life
and well-being, which are neither centered in accu-
mulating material possession of goods, nor in suc-
cess though exploitation. Instead, it involves
relational, spiritual, and affective dimensions of
well-being rooted in the principles of equity, solidar-
ity, cooperation, participation, ability to redistribute,
and co-habitation of diverse modes of living
(Gibson-Graham 2019; Bollier and Helfrich 2021;
Barkin and Lemus 2016).
Clear alternatives that are envisioned and embod-
ied in concrete social experiments and practices
across the world need to be developed, as aligned
with principles for just social-ecological transforma-
tions, and as involving strong alliances across sec-
tors. Faced with this challenge, many questions
arise. How can social emancipation processes that
respect ecological considerations be imagined and
implemented? What would political and cultural
interventions against the endless creation of artificial
desires, which fuels the massive overconsumption of
the global middle and upper classes, look like? What
can actually be learned from those modes of living
that have put forward sustainable adaptation, and
from those communities who resist developmental-
ism and growthism at any cost in their quest for a
good life and satisfaction of needs, particularly
among communities in the margins of the global
South? Such questions foreground the need to con-
sider power arrangements, as well as the possible
winners and losers of political strategies for
“sustainability.” Who is likely to pay for changes
and how do changes affect different social groups
differently? In which segments of society will it
encounter critique and resistance and why? How
can global transformations be built without impos-
ing universal paradigms that absorb or condition
other worldviews, especially in the global South?
How can fruitful alliances be consolidated instead of
imposing solutions via technocratic design?
When it comes to experiences of and the poten-
tial for social-ecological transformations, critical
social science considers progressive social move-
ments and radical social experiments as well as the
ambiguous role of the state (as discussed below).
Those movements often display an intersectionality
of struggles (organized along the lines of race, gen-
der, urban, or agrarian as well as in accordance with
labor or environmental conditions) that is emblema-
ticof their efforts at coalition-building, and they har-
bor alternative values, both by imagining alternative
futures and by enacting different societal relations
to nature (Asara 2016; Barca 2020). Against an
alleged common interest of “humanity” in protect-
ing the environment, alternatives to the escalatory
dynamics of capitalist societies often emerge out of
social-ecological conflicts and mobilizations.
Campaigns like Fridays for Future (Wissen 2020;
Wallis and Loy 2021) or anti-extractivist protests in
many countries of the global South (Svampa 2018;
Martınez-Alier 2020) are gaining in momentum and
effectiveness. Food-sovereignty movements and alli-
ances are also proliferating at the frontlines of
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defending Indigenous knowledge, commoning practi-
ces, and advancing systemic transformation of fossil
fuel-driven food systems. Existing social movements,
particularly in the global South, are successful in
stopping the growth in metabolism or trying to do
so across the world, many of them under the banner
of “environmental justice.” In many instances, forms
of mobilization have led to successful outcomes,
such as the halting of mining projects in Argentina
(Wagner and Walter 2020). In a recent mapping of
649 cases of resistance movements to fossil fuel and
low carbon-energy projects, over a quarter of such
projects have been canceled, suspended, or delayed
– demonstrating the success of place-based move-
ments (Temper et al. 2020). Indigenous resistance to
land dispossession in both the global North and glo-
bal South also claims attention toward biophysical
limits and boundaries, along with the need for a
renegotiation of social boundaries in the form of
self-limitation that makes space to all for a good
life. Here, a range of understandings and practices
of “the good life,” quality of living, and well-being
emerge and often overlap (Manno and Martin
2015). Organizers of these efforts also invented pol-
itical slogans which became prominent in recent
years such as “leaving oil in the soil” from move-
ments in Nigeria and Ecuador. Bottom-up mobiliza-
tions for more sustainable and socially just uses of
the environment occur worldwide, yet environmen-
tal defenders are frequently members of vulnerable
groups and are at a high risk of criminalization,
physical violence, or assassination – as documented
in the analysis of around 3,400 cases in the
Environmental Justice Atlas (Martınez-Alier 2020;
Scheidel et al. 2020).18 Against this background, we
outline some crucial contributions from critical
social science to better understand principles and
criteria of social-ecological transformations.
New processes: Integrating social foundations
and well-being with “boundaries”
In recent years, a growing body of literature sug-
gests that some form of social “boundary” is
required for sustainability transformations. One vis-
ual framework which combines planetary bounda-
ries with social foundations is Kate Raworth’s
(2017) “doughnut economics,” with eleven dimen-
sions of the social foundation based on govern-
ments’ priorities for Rio þ 20, out of a total of
eighty submissions. When social foundations are
met without trespassing planetary boundaries, a
“safe and just space” is attained – through an
appealing infographic called being “in the
doughnut.”19 An interdisciplinary team of social and
environmental scientists have applied national data
to the donut framework to determine where and in
what way “a good life for all within planetary
boundaries” might be attained at a national level
(O’Neill et al. 2018). This group calculated what
social thresholds are achieved and what biophysical
boundaries are transgressed, drawing on seven bio-
physical and eleven social indicators for 150 coun-
tries.20 No country is currently able to respect
planetary boundaries and guarantee the right to a
“good life for all” as defined in the study, although
an analysis based on cities or regions might provide
different results. Two strategies are suggested by the
authors to reduce resource use: 1) to follow
degrowth strategies and a steady-state economy in
rich nations and 2) to restructure and improve
physical and social provisioning systems. Their
understanding of provisioning systems draws on the
work of Fine, Bayliss, and Robertson (2018), which
recognizes the role of power, culture, and regula-
tions in how goods and services are produced, dis-
tributed, and consumed.
It is important to question the representation of
nature-society relations in two circles, where one
(nature) is the external ring that include the other
(society). Raworth’s donut framework does not place
an explicit upper limit on social foundations; they
are implied, in relation to the upper limits of planet-
ary boundaries. However, living the good life in one
context might hinder the possibility for others, else-
where, to do so. As far as the “too much” for some
is a function of the “not enough” for others, upper
limits (not only ecological ones) are necessary, as
trespassing such limits would result in achieving
social foundations at the expense of others ability to
do the same. In a societal boundaries approach,
outer limits are social-ecological. A societal bound-
ary, for example, could place a limit on the develop-
ment of commercial spaces – as a limit to the
encroachment of the public commons, toward not
only curbing the spread of consumerism, but also
that of energy-intensive indoor spaces that are artifi-
cially heated or cooled, and unaffordable for small,
local producers. In such an approach, theories of
social metabolism and societal relations to nature
are brought together in a way that encourages us to
rethink the model in terms of complex, dynamic,
reciprocal, and systemic interrelations.
Beyond the donut model and the calculations
provided by O’Neill et al. (2018), the question of
how to relate human needs to resources is one that
requires social debate and participatory approaches.
Such an approach is proposed in the notion of
“sustainable well-being” (Gough 2017) and is the
main thrust of the “Living Well Within Limits” pro-
ject which emphasizes how citizens might engage in
deliberation around identifying how their needs can
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be met or satisfied in relation to energy sources and
systems of distribution (Brand-Correa and
Steinberger 2017). To address this situation, the
notion of consumption minima and maxima has
been developed recently around the notion of
“consumption corridors” that join notions of envir-
onmental justice and well-being (Fuchs, Steinberger,
et al. 2021; Fuchs, Sahakian, et al. 2021; Wiedmann
et al. 2020). Consumption corridors is a societal
boundary proposal based on the assumption of gen-
eralizable needs common to all. Although a univer-
sal conception of “human needs” is controversial to
some people, it can refer to general commonalities
for a “vague and thick” conception that identifies
essential components of a good life common to all
people, such as bodily integrity, but leaves open
their concrete specification to sociocultural determi-
nations (Nussbaum 2003).
Max-Neef (1991) distinguishes between needs
and satisfiers, where satisfiers are the many different
ways of satisfying a need. Satisfiers can then be
defined through a societal process, while needs are
articulated across different dimensions that cannot
be ranked; for instance the need for affection can
neither replace nor compensate for subsistence.
Within consumption corridors, socially deliberated
need satisfaction is based on the assumption that
meeting needs should not infringe upon the possi-
bility for all people to do the same, now and in the
future. This implies an upper limit to consumption
and use of services.
While consumption corridors have not yet been
operationalized, the concept explicitly places a focus
on what processes are needed for designing them.
Central to the idea are transdisciplinary approaches
that account for a diversity of experiences and forms
of knowledge. Recent developments in relation to
consumption corridors increasingly consider the
role of social practices, or how everyday life is
played out in relation to social norms and people’s
dispositions and material arrangements, in relation
to need satisfaction. However, the societal bounda-
ries that we are proposing here would encompass
consumption but also reflect back on systems of
provision and production processes that facilitate
some forms of consumption over others. Usually,
the norms of production are set by powerful invest-
ors with interests in expanding production, depend-
ent on creating ever-more extensive desires. In
considering research and development dynamics
and current norms around the production and dis-
tribution of commodities, socially set boundaries
would imply processes of industrial conversion and
the phase-out of ecologically problematic branches,
such as the automotive or aviation sectors, coal
mining and burning, and dramatic reductions in
industrial agro- and aquacultures. These efforts
would need to go hand in hand, for instance, with
respective social-ecological industrial policies
(Pichler et al. 2021), all of which would necessitate
structures and processes of economic democracy
(Harvey 2010).
Establishing societal boundaries through diverse
radical alternatives
Alternatives to growth-driven and consumerist cap-
italist modernization must pursue diverse strategies
by strengthening the pluriverse of radical or sys-
temic alternatives that exist across the world and/or
by aiming at transforming the state, be it from out-
side or from within, wherever possible (Jessop
2007). Many alternatives are reassertions of ancient
and traditional approaches, emerging from margi-
nalized peoples and movements of resistance to the
dominant system. Others arise from within modern
or industrialized societies, often from sections of the
middle class or elite urban population that are disil-
lusioned with their own lifestyles and sensitive to
the inequities and unsustainability they perpetuate.
Examples of the former are struggles against extrac-
tivism, development and Western modernity, and
concomitant revival or assertion of Indigenous or
other community worldviews and practices centered
on the good life across the global South, such as
buen vivir, kawsak sacha, kametsa asaike, sentipen-
sar, ubuntu, kyosei, hurai, prakritik swaraj, and min-
obimaatisiiwin, among others (see Appendix 1).
These and many others demonstrate the existence of
approaches that center on solidarity, interconnected-
ness, reciprocity, embeddedness within nature,
health, and other such principles or ethical values.
They share common threads with a number of alter-
natives emerging from industrial society, including
degrowth, ecosocialism, ecofeminism, conviviality,
earth spirituality, pacifism, deep ecology, social ecol-
ogy, commons, environmental justice, eco-anarch-
ism, working-class environmentalism, and rights of
nature. A diversity of alternative practices also exists
around the world, including agroecology, transition
movement, ecovillages, commoning, solidarity econ-
omy, slow movement, worker-led production,
energy and food sovereignty, free software, deep just
transitions informed by climate justice, and others
(see Kothari et al. 2019).
Individually and collectively these conceptions
embody alternatives in worldviews and practices
that challenge the structures of inequality, oppres-
sion, and unsustainability and replace them with
those that promote justice, equality, and sustainabil-
ity. They share a rejection of neoliberal globaliza-
tion, and embrace forms of selective economic
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deglobalization (Bello 2008; Novy 2020) which
involves dismantling the “one big market” (Polanyi
2001 [1944]) coordinated by global financial markets
and sustained by fossil-fuel logistics of airports,
motorways, and cargo shipping. Under certain cir-
cumstances, the collective self-determination of
communities requires control over their own boun-
daries to protect subsistence and livelihood sover-
eignty against global trade and investment
agreements such as the European Union-Mercosur
Treaty with respect to food systems.21 They point to
a comprehensive transformation in political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and ecological spheres of life,
guided by the ethical values noted above.
There is agreement in critical social science that
the role of the state in social-ecological transforma-
tions is ambiguous. Due to the strategic selectivity
of the state in capitalism, it tends, as outlined earlier
in this article, to be part of the problem. Its depend-
ence on growth and taxes pushes state agency
toward securing unsustainable structures, processes,
and power relations even with respect to policies
that, at first sight, intend to deal with the ecological
crisis. In many countries, the repressive side of the
state to defend the interests of elites is much stron-
ger than its distributive side, often acting openly
and in a one-sided manner in the interests of capital
and oligarchies. The boundary between capital and
the state is blurred in the context of thin “market
democracies,” with a growing literature on the
“hollowing out of democracy” and the rise of the
new right (Bello 2019).
But the state can also be part of the solution, as a
terrain for contestation. This depends, however, on
changing the concrete form of the state through
strengthening decentralized units (municipalities)
and democratizing both public institutions of basic
provision (education, health, care) as well as eco-
nomic policy making. In the usual Eurocentric and
“modern” approaches to the state and state theory,
this is a productive and important debate (Eckersley
2021). In many countries, the state is ambiguous in
the sense that it largely secures unsustainability,
while at the same time it has the potential to give
legal and financial recognition to at least some
social-ecological achievements (see discussion
above). The state also has the potential to impose
limits on excessive extraction and exploitation, for
instance by implementing income and wealth caps
(Buch-Hansen and Koch 2019). Furthermore, public
authorities play a key role in shaping decommodi-
fied provision systems (Bayliss and Fine 2020;
Eckersley 2021). The question remains how to prac-
tically enact such limits that lead to more durable
and institutionalized forms of practices and how a
democratic governance of limits can be
implemented across various spatial scales (Lang and
Brand 2015). This emphasis can lead to consider-
ation of what an “anticipatory governance” of limits
or boundaries, instead of existing reactive adapta-
tions, would look like (Biermann and Kim
2020, 508).
The currently dominant form, the nation-state,
has repeatedly demonstrated a serious inability to go
deeper and beyond, at best, a welfare approach, and
this has quite obviously failed to deal with global
issues like the climate crisis. There is a certain cen-
tralization of power involved in this form of state,
and the emphasis on liberal “democracy” that bol-
sters it seems to be more fit for the capitalist econ-
omy than for an ecologically sensitive, people-
centered economy. For instance, Gandhian Swaraj
in India envisions a society without a centralized
state. But even if this was possible, there would still
be the question of coordination and governance at
large scales, given that in an interconnected world
no community can exist in isolation, and given that
ecosystems, cultures, and economies exist at larger
scales. The experience of radical democracy
attempted by the Zapatista and the Kurdish auton-
omy movements are instructive, as they are of a sig-
nificant scale, as are movements of Indigenous self-
determination in Latin America or of self-rule/swa-
raj/radical ecological democracy by communities in
central India (Leyva-Solano 2019; Esteva 2019;
Aslan and Akbulut 2019; Zografos 2019; Shrivastava
2019; Kothari et al. 2019, Kothari and Das 2016).
Meanwhile, as the nation-state will likely continue
to exist for the foreseeable future, movements to
make it accountable, transparent, and responsive,
especially to the needs and rights of the marginal-
ized, and to socioecological sustainability, are as
important as those seeking transformations in the
nature of the state and of power itself. In that sense,
the state at various spatial scales from the local to
the international is also an agent and terrain where
policies for social-ecological transformations are
possibly formulated and implemented (see discus-
sion below). The economy and economic actors,
respectively, are not only profit-driven companies
but could in principle also serve the common good.
And there are also encouraging examples that
social-ecological alternatives get policy and pro-
grammatic support, especially from municipalities
and regional states. The struggle about social-eco-
logical infrastructure, as well as its form and owner-
ship, is central in reproducing or designing
planetary and societal boundaries.
Radical social-ecological transformations would
require putting in place socially sustainable
degrowth strategies at multiple levels of governance
in the global North, and various radical well-being
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strategies in place of the development model in the
global South. Degrowth has been depicted as an
equitable and democratically-led selective downshift-
ing of production and consumption levels that sus-
tains human well-being, social justice, and ecological
conditions, while reducing commodification and
marketization of social life (Schneider, Kallis, and
Martinez-Alier 2010; Sekulova et al. 2013; Jackson
2017; Chertkovskaya, Barca, and Paulsson 2019).
Rooted in the 1970s limits to growth debates, the
concept has vigorously emerged since the early
2000s in social movements and in academic and
intellectual circles, and has emphasized the incom-
patibility between capitalism and ecological sustain-
ability fueled by faith in eco-technology and market
mechanisms. While deconstructing the growth ideol-
ogy (Dale 2012; Schmelzer 2016), degrowth scholar-
ship has focused both on the grassroots practices
and social processes that embody values and inter-
stitial strategies (Wright 2010), and on the institu-
tions and state policies such as caps, green taxes,
worktime reduction, or a basic and a maximum
income that could progressively lead to a prosperous
degrowth. Degrowth does not only challenge the
material and ideological foundations of growth
economies, but also questions the cultural infra-
structure that justifies it (Muraca 2013; on import-
ant differences about degrowth, see Eversberg and
Schmelzer 2018; Spash 2020). Social movements and
projects operating in and around the degrowth
mosaic of alternatives are creating spaces liberated
from the dominant growth addiction, where experi-
ments and experiences in alternative modes of living
are not only possible, but become spaces of demon-
stration and possible amplification (Burkhart et al.
2020). Recent debates and strategy-building around
degrowth also consider the state and its potential
role in social-ecological transformation processes
(D’Alisa and Kallis 2020; Koch 2020).
Conclusion: from planetary boundaries to
social boundaries
The planetary boundaries framework is a powerful
paradigm. What is does not and cannot address by
design, however, is the dominant economic and pol-
itical logics, power relations, and underlying interest
structures as the main societal causes to boundaries
being transgressed. In the most recent paper on
planetary boundaries, the authors claim that “safe
and just corridors for people and planet” will neces-
sitate “an independent synthesis of broader social
science literature” toward understanding causes of
the problem, not just symptoms, but also grappling
with issues related to diversity, governance, and eth-
ics, to name but a few (Rockstr€om, et al. 2021). This
contribution is a first step in that direction.
Research frameworks that combine such biophysical
and critical social analysis, such as social-ecological
economics, ecologically grounded political economy,
political ecology, and social ecology, are a prerequis-
ite to a more comprehensive picture of the key
causal mechanisms inherent in capitalist societies
that are responsible for far-reaching changes in the
biophysical environment that have occurred since
the Industrial Revolution. An initial task of such a
framework would be to commonly develop a better
understanding of the interrelations and interactions
of biophysical and societal structures and processes,
to overcome the disciplinary constraints within the
sustainability research community, and, therefore, to
challenge the downplaying or incomprehension of
dangers associated with pandering to or naively
trusting current decision makers and power-holders.
We have made arguments for a far-reaching
social-ecological transformation. This would include
a new order of knowledge that balances the relation-
ship between natural sciences, on one hand, and
social sciences and humanities, on the other – one
that is both interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary at
its core. In the spirit of epistemological pluralism,
we thus call for a dialogue between natural sciences
and social sciences and the humanities, between so-
called “modern” forms of knowledge and
“traditional” ones, but also between scientific and
“non-canonized” knowledge, toward understanding
and defining the conditions and thresholds in com-
plex social-ecological system dynamics, as in our
call for societal boundaries. This has implications
for the very organization of scientific research and
dialogue. No one discipline or approach is afforded
the luxury anymore of pretending that its findings
are not political, that one’s responsibility as a
researcher ends at the “boundaries” of a specific dis-
cipline or academic sphere. By saying that work
should be transdisciplinary, we are calling for cross-
cutting debate and confrontation and possible merg-
ing of knowledges and ways forward. We envision a
process that includes a constructive critique of the
planetary boundaries concept that is rooted in the
definition of societal boundaries, or a common
work toward “social-ecological boundary settings.”
The collaboration across disciplines and with differ-
ent forms of knowledge is essential: boundary set-
tings, as well as strategies for and practices of self-
limitation, need permanent (scientific and practical)
evaluation of the often unintended destructive
effects and tradeoffs of particular strategies
and practices.
We claim that societal boundaries are necessary
for coping with the deepening ecological crisis and
its devastating socioeconomic impacts – especially
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for those who already live under precarious condi-
tions and whose voices are not generally heard in
the halls of decision making. With the notion of
societal boundaries, we bring together procedural
questions, as discussed above, with an explicit recog-
nition of the need for self-limitation at the collective
level or, in other words, of freedom as autonomy –
autonomy not defined as independency but as abil-
ity for self-determination. By drawing on the work
of Karl Polanyi, we claim that collective self-limita-
tion is the condition for achieving not only justice,
but also “freedom not only for the few, but for all”
(Polanyi 2001 [1944], 265) – freedom rooted in tak-
ing responsibility for the social (and environmental)
impacts of actions on others. The pursuit of collect-
ive freedom is central to the notion of “societal
boundaries,” as a terrain where different worldviews
and understandings of current problems and social-
ecological transformations can be negotiated.22
This idea of freedom involves organizing societies
and their social metabolism in a way that its mem-
bers do not have to live at the expense of others. It
also invites us to acknowledge that, historically,
societies always established limits in different forms.
The practice and long-standing patterns of com-
moning that endure, despite the continuing push for
dispossession, illustrates this poignantly. The illusion
of “no limits” and “winners take it all” is quite new,
bolstered by the capitalist mode of production and
living. They were worked into the capitalist imagin-
ary as a counterpart to the economic concept of
scarcity rooted in the Spencerian social Darwinist
version of evolution that sustains economic thinking
since the nineteenth century.23 Accordingly, in a
world of scarce resources, the fittest are to survive,
while the rest may either serve or not survive at all.
Instead of collective self-limitation as an exercise of
social freedom, freedom for the few takes the form
of the imperial mode of living (or living at the
expense of others) (Brand and Wissen 2021)
through expansion (colonialism, neoextractivism),
exploitation of cheap production factors (enslaved,
exploited, and precarized labor), intensification of
productivity, and externalization of consequences
(waste, destruction of subsistence-based commun-
ities) onto subaltern social groups or onto
the future.
At the same time, we acknowledge that capitalist
relations are never “total” but remain contested.
Other forms of societal organization such as, for
example, solidarity economies or some types of care
and reproductive work, do exist in parallel, and in
some ways constitute the submerged part of an
“iceberg economy,” or economic activities that are
hidden from view and devalued, but nonetheless
constitute the foundation of the so-called productive
economy (Mies et al. 1998; Gibson-Graham 2019).
They are not necessarily independent from the cap-
italist economy, nor are they per se “sustainable,”
but they have other principles of functioning and
value practices that are alternative to the hegemonic
profit-oriented ones. In the global North as well as
the global South, these other forms of living
together are increasingly under threat as people and
communities are firmly nudged or violently coerced
into entering the capitalist mode of production and
living. Ecological distribution conflicts and social-
ecological movements are increasingly rising in
resistance to the escalating global social metabolism
and its devastating impacts: expansion of commod-
ity frontiers, commodification of nature and space,
and neoliberal/austerity governance (Muradian,
Walter, and Martinez-Alier 2012; Temper et al.
2018; Calvario, Velegrakis, and Kaika 2017).
Alliances among various social movements, groups,
practices, and lived social experiments across the
global North and the global South are already
actively defending spaces for alternative ways of liv-
ing together and securing the conditions for a “good
life for all.”
In a world of societal limits, the conditions for
living a good life are defined through a collective
process that accounts for sociopolitical struggles and
hinge on the ability of others to do the same. In the
societal boundaries concept, freedom as autonomy
is ensured because of a just, deliberative process that
leads to social and political rules that guarantee the
substantial conditions for a good life for all. The lib-
eration from the heteronomous, pervasive logic of
unfettered expansion and acceleration sustains the
individual and collective value of freedom as not
having to live at the expense of others.
Notes
1. While social metabolism mostly refers to the stocks
and flows of matter and energy that characterize a
society or a type of society (e.g., the social
metabolism of industrial capitalism based on fossil
fuels is radically different from that of feudal
societies), the concept of societal relations to nature
expands the perspective to include flows of
information and meaning – that is the symbolic
dimensions – in interactions between what is
historically (and contingently) seen as “society” and
as “nature,” and how such relations are embodied in
institutions and practices (Hummel et al. 2017).
2. As explained later in this article, the logic is
heteronomous (as a rule imposed from the outside)
insofar as it operates as a functional rationality that
regulates conduct and is not subject to deliberation.
3. By deep democratic process we mean more than
formal democracy. Such a process would lead to a
democratization of societal relations to nature and a
democratization of the economy, thus supporting
substantial participation and responsibility of all
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societal members in framing and sustaining the
conditions of living in common.
4. These include climate change, ocean acidification,
stratospheric ozone depletion, nitrogen and
phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, change in
land use, biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol
loading, and chemical pollution (Rockstr€om et al.
2009a, 472).
5. Biermann and Kim (2020, 513) list additional
reasons for the success of the concept, but they also
see little support for it from political actors in the
global South as they refer more to the target-setting
bodies of existing treaties such as the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
6. See a critique from an Earth-systems governance
perspective in the comprehensive review of
Biermann and Kim (2020).
7. Anthropologist Arturo Escobar (1996, 70) laments
that “[c]onventional approaches also fragment the
culturally constructed spatiality represented in
particular landscapes, precisely because they are
blind to sociocultural dynamics.”
8. One finds citations of Wilkinson and Pickett’s book
The Spirit Level and to an article by Raworth about
“doughnut economics” in a paper co-authored by
Steffen in 2013, yet these references are mobilized
merely for the descriptive content. Social
mechanisms and structures that produce inequality
remain undiscussed, as if inequalities just “happen.”
9. While biogeophysical system tipping points and
thresholds are not sociopolitical constructs, they can
only be verified in hindsight, meaning that
predictions concerning the existence of these tipping
points are also the product of social/human practice.
Our argument aims to be realist while
acknowledging that the views, theories, and
conclusions of the natural sciences are informed by
social relations of knowledge production.
10. For example, when waste becomes a valuable
commodity to the point of crowding out
motivations to reduce its production by individuals
or businesses and to depoliticize waste production
(Valenzuela and B€ohm 2017; Moreau et al. 2017).
11. This does not exclude the fact that, from a
metabolic perspective, technological lock-in also
emerges from, and is reinforced by, the material
properties of biophysical structures, in particular
infrastructures which, once in place, favor certain
processes of institutionalizations and hinder others.
Yet the social existence of these structures in a
capitalist economy depends largely on continued
investment and expenditure in order to expand the
capacity to exploit; social and material causalities are
enmeshed one in other.
12. Of course, though we characterize contemporary
societies as capitalist, we are aware that other forms
of domination and power such as patriarchy,
anthropocentrism, and statism coexist and thrive
under capitalism without being reducible to its logic.
13. We are aware that there are different understandings
of capitalism or capitalist societies. We present a
very broad understanding which is most plausible to
us. Other approaches to social sciences and
humanities, for instance institutionalist theories,
theories of psychological behavior, or economic
incentives or modernization theory, explain the
ecological crisis differently. Here we outline core
insights from critical social science that might
contribute to the debate on societal drivers of
unsustainability that lead to the transgression of
planetary boundaries.
14. By capital, we refer to an institutionalized social
relation where money is invested in an economic
process of commodity production to generate
returns (Marx). In this process, the monetary form
of capital is transformed through productive
expenditure into other forms like human labor,
machines and tools, material and energy inputs,
rights to land, and nature. All these forms are
mobilized toward the one end of generating a
monetary surplus through the production of
commodities (be they goods or services). Capital
cannot be reduced to one of the forms it takes on
during this process because they are all aspects of its
metamorphosis during circulation (Harvey 2010).
Accordingly, capital is neither saved money nor
machines and inventory, nor is it reaped profits, but
the overall process that unites these forms. A further
characteristic of capital is the reinvestment of
monetary surpluses, expanding thus the mass of
value that must find profitable outlays.
Accumulation thus refers to a dual process of an
ever-expanding mass of value changing form during
its circulation in the economy and to the imperative
of profitable investment of surpluses which implies
further growth. The accumulation of capital must
thus not be confused with a growing stock of
productive material artefacts and infrastructures,
though these realities are related.
15. Relative-to-GDP measures are particularly
pernicious because they naturalize the principle of
GDP growth when growth itself should be
problematized.
16. Earth-system functions operate like a grundnorm
which translates roughly into a “basic standard” or a
rationally incontrovertible principle, insofar as they
provide “a basis for international environmental
agreements because anthropogenic projects that do
not respect planetary boundaries with respect
to… any of the nine interacting components of the
Earth System, will (ultimately) fail empirically”
(Schmidt 2019, 728). The grundnorm is accordingly
not derived from nature, but from how Earth-
system science articulates human-Earth integration.
17. With substantial conditions we mean conditions that
are not merely formal, but include objective (for
example, material or economic), subjective (for
example, psychological), and intersubjective
(sociocultural) conditions for achieving a good life
in the sense of a life worth of a human being, or a
life that people have a good and defensible reason to
value (Sen 2009; Muraca 2012). This conception
leaves the space open for different specifications and
understandings that may vary from community to
community and across individuals. Collective self-
limitation aims at ensuring the real conditions for
the achievement of a good life for all. This might
imply that the ways in which well-being is achieved
for some people might have to change radically, as
these conditions could, in the sense articulated by
Martha Nussbaum, be hindering the possibility of
others to achieve well-being as a moral entitlement.
18. For the Environmental Justice Atlas, see https://
ejatlas.org.
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19. See Spash (2020) for a discussion of Raworth’s
ambiguous relationship to degrowth.
20. The seven biophysical measures include four
planetary boundary indicators (CO2 emission,
phosphorous, nitrogen, blue water), two footprint
indicators (ecological footprint, material footprint)
and eHANPP. The eleven social measures
(compatible with the SDGs) include nine need
satisfiers (nutrition, sanitation, income, access to
energy, education, social support, equality,
democratic quality, and employment) and two
measures of human well-being (self-reported life
satisfaction, healthy life expectancy). To empirically
study “living well within limits,” Brand-Correa and
colleagues therefore suggest a mixed-methods
approach which includes quantitative top-down and
bottom-up methods as well as qualitative,
participatory methods (consultations, workshops,
focus groups) to examine satisfiers and well-being
dimensions in communities (see e.g., Brand-Correa
et al 2018).
21. Mercosur is the Spanish term for the Southern
Common Market comprising several Latin American
countries. The group was established in 1991 by the
Treaty of Asuncion and its full members are
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Associate
members are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guyana, Peru, and Suriname. Venezuela was
suspended in 2016.
22. Implementing the conditions for a good life for all
implies regulations against transgressing of
collectively determined societal boundaries, as we
have articulated earlier in this article regarding
consumption corridors. This requires political
sanctioning and coercion against individual
conception of a good life that hinder the
achievement of conditions of a good life for all, but
also entails progressive social movements and
alternative projects, toward supporting sociocultural
norms rooted in social justice considerations.
23. This refers to Herbert Spencer’s rendering of
Darwin’s evolution theory as applied to social
systems. It was Spencer who introduced the idea of
“survival of the fittest” and of individual
competition, whereas Darwin stressed the
importance of “social instincts” and sympathy in
human societies (see Dardot and Laval 2017).
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Worldview Brief Overview Further Details
Buen vivir Is an understanding of well-being emanated from Indigenous people’s
modes of living. It translates most accurately into “living in plenitude.”
Similar notions exist in most indigenous societies across the Americas.
In Ecuador, it was introduced in the country’s political constitution in
2008, and from then became a slogan for public policies rather
synonymous to “development.” To challenge this new meaning,
Indigenous peoples in Ecuador have avoided using the Spanish term
and shifted to the term in the Kichwa language, sumak kawsay.
Monica Chuji et al in K othari
et al. (2019)
Kawsak Sacha Means “living forest” in the Kichwa language. It is a worldview promoted
by the Amazonian Kichwa people of Sarayaku in the Ecuadorian
Amazon and refers to the rainforest as a conscious community of
living beings, both material and spiritual, of which humans are only
one part.
https://kawsaksacha.org/en/;
Patricia Gualinga in Kothari et
al. (2019)
Sentipensar Is the process by which we put thought and feeling to work together. It
is the fusion of two ways of perceiving and interpreting reality from
both reflection and emotional impact, until they converge in one
same act of knowledge and action. The term is born from those
words expressed by the fishermen in San Benito Abad (Sucre) to the
Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda: “We act with the heart, but
we also use the head, and when we combine the two things like this,
we are sentipensantes.”
Patricia Botero Gomez in
Kothari et al. (2019)
Kametsa Asaike Term loosely translates as “living well together in this place” and dervies
from an indigenous philosophy for well-being originating in the
Ashaninka people of the Peruvian Amazon. It stresses two essential
aspects: that the well-being of an individual can be only possible
through the well-being of the collective, which includes humans,
other-than-humans, and the Earth as a whole; and that it comes from
and feeds into deliberative practice, with all in the collective working
at it.
Emily Caruso and Juan Pablo
Sarmiento Barletti in Kothari
et al. (2019)
Ubuntu A southern African concept that denotes ”humanness” encompassing
both a state of being and a state of becoming. This stresses that the
relational aspects of life are essential; a human is not an atomized
individual, but part of multiple collectives and their inter-relationships,
including those of the non-human. Ubuntu is derived from or related
to multiple concepts and expressions found south of the Sahara,
including Umuntungumuntungabanye Bantu (“we are, therefore I am”)
in the Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele languages, Botho in Sotho-Tswana
languages, and others.
Leslie Le Grange in Kothari et
al. (2019)
Kyosei Is a Japanese term for symbiosis, conviviality, or living together, referring
to relations within humans (between the genders, various cultures,
and so forth) and between humans and the rest of nature.
Importantly, it does not aim to homogenize, but stresses equality and
sustainability by respecting diversity and heterogeneity, including of
cultures, ecologies, ways of being, and knowing.
Motoi Fuse in Kothari et
al. (2019)
Hurai Is part of the cosmology of the Tuva ethnic community in China. It
roughly translates as “all the best things,” and includes aspects such
as good life, health, sustainability, love, respect, and sanctity. Placing
nature and gods ahead of humans, it stresses that when they are
happy, humans too will be happy, and therefore our actions must be
oriented toward safeguarding the well-being of all. Hurai has assumed
an important position in the cultural revival movement of the
Tuva people.
Yuxin Hou in Kothari et
al. (2019)
Swaraj Is an ancient Indian concept, revived and popularized by Mahatma
Gandhi. It roughly means “self-rule,” and encompasses individual and
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Worldview Brief Overview Further Details
collective sovereignty, with a foundation of spiritual and ethical
responsibility toward all. This means that the individual is embedded
in collectives, and while acting freely, cannot undermine other
people’s ability to also act freely. A radical, direct democracy (very
different from its western liberal form) is embedded in swaraj. In
recent times, it has been expanded into the concepts of eco-swaraj
and prakritik (natural) swaraj to emphasize that responsibility extends
to all of nature.
Aseem Shrivastava and Ashish
Kothari in Kothari et
al. (2019)
Minobimaatisiiwin Is a concept denoting “living a good life” or in a “total state of well-
being,” rooted in the Anishinaabe and Cree native North American
worldviews. It emphasizes holism, with a foundation of respect toward
and reciprocity with not only other humans but all animals, plants,
rocks, water, spirits, celestial beings, ancestors, and future generations.
For anyone to be healthy, all have to be healthy, and so mutual
respect and care are crucial. In recent times, minobimaatisiiwin has
become an important part of the revitalization of indigenous
healing systems.
Deborah McGregor in Kothari
et al. (2019)
Taoism Originates from the Tao Indigenous people, inhabiting their home island
Pongso no Tao located off the coast of Taiwan. It is built on an
inextricably close link between the cycles of human activity and the
cycles of natural seasons, the ocean, and all of marine and terrestrial
life. It encompasses an ontology based on the trinity of language,
culture, and biological diversity. Human activity is oriented by a
complex and unique calendar combining lunar and solar cycles and of
the seasonality of fish and other marine life.
Sutej Hugu in Kothari et
al. (2019)
Ibadism A little-known school within Islam and predating the Sunni-Shia divide,
Ibadism is built on a foundation of egalitarian relationships, simplicity,
sobriety, and independence that respects the needs and
independence of others. Religious tolerance and ethnic plurality is
stressed, and in some variants (such as Djerba Island of Tunisia), self-
governing communities that are autonomous of the state. Currently
Ibadism is followed in Oman and by sections of society in Libya,
Algeria, Zanzibar, and Tunisia.
Mabrouka M’barek in Kothari
et al. (2019)
Jineoloji Is the philosophical and ideological basis for the Kurdish ecofeminist
movement in the region between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, which
is attempting to create a demarcated area of peace, direct democracy,
and well-being with ecological responsibility. “It is the science that
studies women based on the identity of life-woman, nature-woman,
social-nature-woman, the culture thus created, its reflection on historic
society and the reasons, sources and outcomes of the transformation
of institutions, structures and concepts stemming from the definition
of women. We may also define jineoloji as life science, social science,
meaning science democratic modernity science and free co-life science
in addition to science of women.”
http://jineoloji.org/en/
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